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Abstract
The history of American philosophical thought is marked by a skepticism of 
epistemology and immutable truths, which is drawn under the term pragmatism. This 
skepticism is the genesis for the political and social attitudes that makes the United States 
exceptional. This thesis argues that this exceptionalism is important to the makeup of the 
American character and that it is being threatened by two front: ideologically driven 
politics, and the abuse of power by the majority. In the course of writing this essay I 
evaluated a large portion of the body of American philosophy as well as political and 
judicial writers in order to show that American exceptionalism is based upon a 
philosophical rejection of epistemology and immutable truth claims and that 
exceptionalism is integral to the progress of America as a nation.
Keywords: Philosophy, Pragmatism, Epistemology, Politics, History, America
“Thinking is the function, living is the functionary”
-Ralph Waldo Emerson
Introduction
American exceptionalism, the concept that the United States stands outside the 
boundaries of the rest of the world in such a way as to be incomparable to other nations, 
has been a staple tactic that sociologists and political scientists employ to explain a  
perceived uniqueness that this country allegedly possesses. More often than not, they 
attempt to explain this exceptionalism economically or socially. For example, the 
sociologist Seymore Lipset describes the United States as being “qualitatively different” 
when compared to other states (13). While this sort of demarcation is useful in the 
political and social realms, it can be useful in philosophical discussions as well. Instead 
of inspecting the specifically economic or social aspects of this alleged exceptionalism, I  
shall attempt in this essay to trace this exceptionalism in terms of American philosophy,  
rigorous and academic as well as informal and non-traditional. I intend to show that what 
makes America unique is not just its political and social structures, but the way in which 
its people think. The method of thought of the American people leads to the traditional 
markers of American exceptionalism. I shall also attempt to argue that this sort of 
exceptionalism is under threat by the rise of ideologies and must be protected in order for 
the United States to remain viable and competitive in the global conversation. The 
American project is historically and philosophically unique, but that uniqueness is under 
threat from its progeny. Ideology bolstered by democracy unrestrained by a pragmatic 
approach to problems leads to a stagnation of the the American experiment. At the same 
time, the inter-subjective character of the pragmatic view of truth reduces our ability to 
achieve results (or even begin to attempt to solve problems) if we do not have some sort 
of goal post for the conversation. I shall argue that that goal post is the continuation of the 
conversation. If the conversation continues, it is more likely to yield results.
The first portion of this essay consists of an inspection and explanation of the 
history of pragmatism as an American academic tradition. I shall thoroughly describe 
pragmatism's main claims and its position in relation to the epistemological and 
metaphysical debates in contemporary philosophy. The history of American pragmatism 
is partly characterized as a school of thought that rejects traditional epistemology as a 
legitimate field of inquiry, and thus sharply divides itself from the rest of contemporary 
philosophy. This divorce from other schools of philosophy allows for frank discussions 
about the nature and usefulness of philosophy, leading one to a question of the role of 
philosophy in the present and future. Additionally, pragmatism's rejection of 
epistemology as a legitimate field of inquiry allows for inclusion of thinkers not 
traditionally considered philosophers into the discussion. If we can show that the 
traditional  conception of metaphysical epistemology (knowledge is justified true belief)  
is flawed, then we remove the boundary between philosophy and the rest of society. For 
if philosophy is no better at explaining knowledge than the rest of society is, then no 
discussion about philosophy can be strictly exclusive to that field. Thus, the second 
portion of the essay concentrates on non-traditional sources of American pragmatism in 
an attempt to show that pragmatism has been an American tradition well before it was 
described by academia as a legitimate school of philosophy. In this tracing I will address 
the division between academic philosophy and other sources of philosophical thought. I 
will show how that division is created out of a self-preservationist instinct by 
philosophers. The reason for the need to address this division is that pragmatism tends to 
keep in the foreground the idea of contingency. The facticity of our being (living in a 
certain place at a certain time in a certain sociological sphere) requires us to consider our 
ideas and conversations not as declarations of truth external to us. It informs us that 
statements can be revised given new information.
In the second portion of this essay I shall address a number of counter-arguments 
to my proposition that pragmatism is a legitimate argument and that it is an American 
tradition. Initially, I will address a realist counter-argument that claims that by dispelling 
epistemology as a legitimate field of inquiry, the pragmatist misunderstands the nature of 
human knowledge and therefore cannot compete in the world of philosophical discussion. 
The second of these counter-arguments is a post-modern attempt to dispel my thesis as 
merely one story among many, that my history is  just one more story on the same plane 
as any other story about America, and therefore cannot be taken as truth. I will then 
address competing descriptions of American thought, specifically the libertarian model 
espoused by the modern political right. This libertarian model rejects the pragmatic 
notion of inter-subjective agreement as the closest description of truth that we can 
achieve, and thus declares that the highest good in any society is the freedom of the 
individual in spite of government and society. This directly conflicts with the pragmatic 
desire to experiment and compromise socially. 
In the next portion of this essay I shall present a case for American exceptionalism 
as pragmatic thought being under threat. I will attempt to show that this sort of pragmatic 
character is vital to the overall health of the nation's psyche and thus must be protected 
from what I will describe as an attack upon it by ideologues. Ideologically driven 
opinions have come to dominate much of American political and social life, and thus the 
conversations we need to be having are cast aside for screaming matches about whose 
ideology is better. The true intent of pragmatism is to continue the conversation in order 
to find solutions to problems. If the conversations we are having are not forward-
thinking, future oriented, then we are wasting time and effort.
Lastly, I will address the most troubling counter-argument to my thesis: is 
pragmatism its own enemy? If pragmatism deflates truth to inter-subjective agreement, 
then that democratic attitude about truth can endanger the exceptionalism that was caused 
by the American pragmatic character.
Pragmatism the Philosophy
American pragmatism can be understood in terms of the school of philosophy that 
includes Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey and subsequent neo-
pragmatists like, Wilfred Sellars, C. I. Lewis, Thomas Kuhn, Willard van Orman Quine, 
and Richard Rorty. This school's central claim is that truth is a quality of an idea that 
works. If an idea works, then we consider it to be true. If it fails, then it is false. This 
claim is in direct conflict with theories of knowledge that include either a rationalist  
approach to epistemology or a correspondence (traditionally empiricist) theory of truth1. 
For example, the statement 'there is a force that acts upon all objects and that force is 
called gravity' is true for at least the pragmatist and the adherer to a correspondence 
theory of truth. The pragmatist would say that the reason that this statement is true is that 
allows us to explain other phenomena very well, thus the statement works. The traditional 
empiricist would claim that the statement is true because we can match up observations 
about gravity with the statement. Thus, the statement is true regardless of whether or not 
we believe it to be true. This split will be explained in detail below. The rationalist would 
take issue with the use of the word 'true' being a description of the statement, because for 
the rationalist, the only true statements are those that can be determined to be true via 
reason alone. 
Rationalism, the epistemological school of thought that claims that knowledge 
comes solely from reason, rejects the notion of truth being determined by utility. The 
senses can deceive, according to the rationalist, and thus perception cannot be trusted for 
a foundation of knowledge. In modern terms, we could consider the rationalist's truth as 
an analytic truth: those statements that are true based solely on the definitions of the 
terms. The idea of the existence of purely analytic truths is in direct contrast with the 
pragmatist's dependence upon empirical observation, and as we shall see later in this 
1. Empiricism is an epistemological school of thought that claims that all knowledge is  
based upon experience.
section, seems to be impossible unless we can point to a semantic/syntactical distinction. 
The problem in finding a semantic/syntactical distinction is that it is very difficult, if not  
impossible, to separate the two. It appears that content is necessary for form to have 
meaning, and thus there may be no analytic truths as such. The content of analytic truths 
must signify something, and thus these statements are dependent upon a complex web of 
beliefs. We shall revisit this conversation in the Quine section below.
Peirce and James
Charles Sanders Peirce has been cast aside by modern pragmatists as a 
philosopher unwilling to admit the logically end of his thinking. The progeny of the 
original pragmatists, Richard Rorty, rejected Peirce almost out of hand. “His contribution 
to pragmatism was merely to have given it a name, and to have stimulated [William] 
James” (112). What Rorty did not rightly credit Peirce with was outlining a maxim for 
pragmatism. The maxim reads as follows: “consider what effects, that might conceivably 
have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our 
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (Peirce, 36). In 
other words, the effects of the the action are what mattered to Peirce. James took this 
statement to be talk about truth, but Peirce made it clear in a letter to James that James  
had misunderstood him. This split between Peirce and William James can be understood 
best by Peirce's insistence upon a convergence of ideas (specifically of science) that 
resembles a sort of post-Hegelian fatalism.
All followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of 
investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to 
every question to which they can be applied...no modification of the point 
of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of 
mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion...that is 
the way I would explain reality. (Peirce, 44-45)
Here we see that Peirce is still clinging on to a realist, correspondence idea of 
truth, one that views human knowledge as a project that adds to itself in a way that will 
eventually reach an end goal: a convergent and complete knowledge of the world. 
William James rejected this convergence of ideas and instead maintained a sort of 
relativism or, more rightly, a skepticism about our ability to know the world in the way 
Peirce desired.
William James fully took up the charge of pragmatism when Peirce renamed his 
philosophy pragmaticism in an attempt to remove himself from what he saw as 
impending relativism2. In his essay What Pragmatism Means, James outlined his own 
maxim of his method. “To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we 
need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may 
involve...our conceptions of these effects...is then for us the whole of our conception of 
the object” (95). This maxim is almost identical to Peirce's and yet separate from it in a 
serious way. For Peirce, the concept is secondary to the object, yet part of the experience 
of the object. For James, there seems to be no way to separate the object from the concept 
of it in a way as to divorce meaning from practical effects. This is because there is no 
2. This fear of relativism has been a consistent theme throughout the history of pragmatism, although it 
may be overcome. See the last section of this essay for a discussion on the dangers of relativism and how it 
can be overcome.
way to divorce the object from the person perceiving the object to the extent that we can 
know anything about said object. Perception (and thus conceptualization) must occur for 
anything to be known about any object, and that act of perceiving is the closest thing to 
knowledge that the pragmatist can claim. In order for us to know anything about an 
object, we must be able to observe it (directly or indirectly). If we cannot observe an 
object then we cannot claim to know it to exist or talk about it in anything but theoretical  
terms. For example, black holes are believed to exist, and there is a body of evidence 
supporting their existence. They are, however, in principle, unable to be observed (light 
cannot even escape the event horizon of a black hole), and thus are theoretical. We can 
talk about certain objects that we can observe being affected by an object like a black 
hole, but to claim that we know that black holes exist is to claim that we can have 
knowledge about an object that we cannot observe if we retain the notion that knowledge 
must be verified separate from justification.
This division between James and Peirce was due, in part, to James' interest in 
settling metaphysical disputes by determining the practical results of either side of those 
disputes. He was thus uninterested in the metaphysical disputes that yeilded no practical 
difference. To clarify James' point, consider the following: if one person holds a belief in 
metaphysical object x and another person metaphysical object y, and in the end they can 
agree that the real world effects of believing either position are the same, then the dispute,  
according to James, does not matter. Thus, either believe (in y or x) is acceptable because 
neither one makes a difference to the end result of the inquiry. For example, whether we 
claim that a thing called 'gravity' is what causes an object to fall to the ground or not 
matters little because it is not the cause or concept that is important, it is the practical  
result, (in this case, the falling of the object). Replacing terms does not change an action. 
We could call gravity anything else and it would make no difference to the end result.
This led to James' writing of The Will to Believe and eventually to his pragmatic 
approach to religious belief, which boiled down to a concession that what is good for a 
person is what is good to believe. This latter point is due to his linking the terms good 
and true into an inseparable partnership. The consequences of James' maxim on 
epistemology are striking, for it seems to lead to a relativism characterized by no criterion 
for truth other than what one likes. Thus, epistemology becomes aesthetics, and that is 
wholly unacceptable to either side of the epistemological divide. If epistemology is  
aesthetics, if what is true is merely what we like, then nearly anything could be true for 
anyone. The adhere to the correspondence theory of truth would reject this as so far afield 
from their definition of truth that it is nearly absurd. Truth, for them, is a quality of a 
statement that matches up an observation of the world with the world itself. This 
conflation of aesthetics with epistemology is also troubling for the pragmatist because it  
seems to say that the personal, individual tastes of one individual would dictate the truth 
for them. James encountered another interesting ramification of his description of truth; 
the concept of truth that he outlines must also fall under the maxim declared in What 
Pragmatism Means (“we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind 
the object may involve”). The descriptive term 'true' relates only to what is effective, 
what is in agreement with other concepts. Truthfulness becomes a species of good, 
because what is good is what works.
This latter statement is the breaking point between epistemological realists and 
anti-realists. The realist is interested in matching up concepts to the world to verify that  
they are true, and the anti-realists claim that there is no matching up to be done. The 
realist's position is consistent with the traditional conception of knowledge. That 
conception has three requirements: that s believe that p is true, that s is justified in 
believing that p is true, and p is, in fact, true. For example, the statement 'I know that the 
sky is blue' would be true if and only if I were to believe it to be true, I am justified in 
believing it to be true, and that it is, indeed, true. The pragmatist, the anti-realist in this  
case, challenges the ability of s to verify that p is true in a way separate from justification. 
The Jamesean pragmatist points out that there seems to be no way to separate truth from 
justification because of the subjective nature of experience. We can have one million 
confirmations of the same phenomenon, and we can make a statement about that 
phenomenon that we are justified in believing to be true (there were a million 
confirmations, after all), but we cannot then verify the statement independently from 
those justifications. To attempt to do so would be to attempt to escape the mental 
processes we, as humans, ceaselessly perform, and gain some sort of objective 
perspective on the world. 
The pragmatist argues that there is no way to have an objective, external view of 
the world in order to verify truth claims. All we have is inter-subjective agreement. 
Instead of searching for agreement with the world and our statements, pragmatism urges 
us to seek agreement with each other's statements. This leads to a coherence concept of 
truth, one that requires us to seek justification for the truth of statements not in a 
matching up with the real world, but a consistency with other statements of beliefs that 
we hold to be true. In other words, under the coherence theory of truth, justification is a 
matter of being consistent with other statements in an entangled web. Willard Van Orman 
Quine, as we shall see below, addressed this explicitly in his seminal work, The Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism.
James' other contribution to pragmatism was the birth of the idea that he called 
radical empiricism. James accused supposed empiricists of relying upon systems like 
logic and mathematics in the same way that prior generations of philosophers relied upon 
God. In order to be a radical empiricist, We must subject all truth claims to the possibility 
of revisability, including mathematics and logic, otherwise we are discussing the 
metaphysical, which we have no justification for discussing. Systems such as 
mathematics and logic are unable to justify their own existence independent of 
themselves. They are internally consistent, but are not able to be justified externally. Here 
we can see, at the inception of pragmatism, there was a skepticism about epistemology 
and its relation to the human mind. James eventually turned to psychology and in fact 
may be credited with inventing the field in an attempt, in part, to escape the trap of 
philosophy, the trap of talking about the mind as a metaphysical entity.
Dewey's Politics and Experimental Philosophy
By the second decade of the twentieth century, John Dewey had taken up the 
reigns of pragmatism. While he was a philosopher, he felt that he fit the role of an 
educator even more so. His attack on the Founding Fathers' metaphysical mistake is one 
of the most significant rebuttals to the concreteness of metaphysical principles ever put 
forth. In Liberalism and Social Action, he cuts to the chase, challenging the concept of 
immovable objects of inquiry by questioning Jefferson's teleological claim to God-given 
rights. One of Dewey's most positive contributions to philosophy was to extend the 
scientific method to philosophy, not how the positivists (and phenomonologists on the 
Continent) did, but by allowing experimentation to be a part of the process of inquiry. In 
his essay The Need For a Recovery of Philosophy, Dewey calls philosophy, especially the 
kind that had been turned into an academic discipline, “unusually conservative...clinging 
to problems...the association of philosophy with academic teaching has reinforced this 
intrinsic conservatism” (219). He goes on to give one of the most succinct descriptions of 
pragmatism, the American philosophical contribution, ever written. 
It is often said that pragmatism, unless it is content to be a contribution to 
mere methodology, must develop a theory of Reality. But the chief 
characteristic trait of the pragmatic notion of reality is precisely that no 
theory of Reality in general, uberhaupt, is possible or needed. It occupied 
the position of an emancipated empiricism or a thoroughgoing naïve 
realism. It finds that 'reality' is a denotative term, a word used to 
designate indifferently everything that happens (222).
This sentiment, that attempting to develop a theory of reality is a worthless 
pursuit, is rooted in the pragmatic rejection of epistemology as a legitimate field of 
inquiry. If we give up the notion that it is possible to describe the world in a way that is 
verifiably true, independent of experience (which seems impossible even for the most 
staunch realist), then we are free to pursue conversations that actually make a difference 
in end result. Questions about the nature of knowledge and reality do nearly nothing for 
the overall edification of mankind. Instead, we can turn to questions about how to better 
the quality of life for individuals and societies. This is not to say that reality should not be 
described, but that a consistent, whole, theory of reality seems unachievable given the 
limitations of human observation and the revisability of all statements. Science readily  
admits this, while philosophy still clings on to the desire to explain the entirety of reality.
By the time Dewey was in his twilight years, he was not interested in the 
linguistic turn that American philosophy had taken and thus was left on the shelves of 
philosophical history until Richard Rorty resurrected his sentiment thirty years later.
Kuhn's Description of Science Applied to Philosophy
In the mean time, however, Thomas Kuhn shook the world of the philosophy of 
science in his work The Structures of Scientific Revolutions. In that essay he outlines 
what he observes to be a split between “normal” and “abnormal” (or revolutionary) 
science. Kuhn introduced the idea of paradigms: cultural and historical spheres 
characterized by vocabularies and social practices that are indicative of the science being 
conducted. The facticity, the time, place, and society in which the science is being 
conducted matters to the outcome of that science. When there is no serious competition, 
science is in the “normal” phase, predicting and explaining within that current paradigm. 
For example, the period between Newton's writing of Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica and Einstein's publication of his annus mirabilis papers (especially the 
paper on special relativity) could be considered a period of normal science in which the 
Newtonian paradigm was worked within. After Einstein’s revolution, physics moved into 
an abnormal phase, upheaving much of what had been done prior to that time. Eventually, 
Kuhn claims, there is a competing theory for a certain piece of the paradigm that shifts 
the conversation away from the current paradigm so much so that it revolutionizes the 
vocabulary of science and thus is incommensurable when compared to the previous 
paradigm. A new paradigm is then born, although that change is not noticeable for some 
time. 
The pragmatic notion we can get from this work is that if science, which is the 
torch-bearer of modern empiricism, must admit fallibility in its truth claims, then 
philosophy, the primary truth-claimant of history, must be seen not as seeking truths, but 
seeking reasonable explanations. Why would philosophy be any more privileged in its 
ability, or better equipped, to describe the world than science is? Science should admit, in 
the face of this argument, that it is not in the business of epistemology, but rather in the 
business of reasonable explanation. If science must admit that it is in the business of 
arguing what is reasonable to believe (and not what is the truth), then philosophy must do 
the same. The consequences of this turn from certainty to revisability was echoed in 
Willard Van Orman Quine's later work.
Before I discuss Quine's role in the pragmatic lineage, it is necessary to emphasize 
the point that Kuhn has made here. Instead of seeking immutable truths, it is more 
edifying to mankind for science and philosophy both to seek reasonable explanations. 
This is because it appears that it is impossible to get to the sort of truth that nearly the 
entirety of the history of  philosophy attempted to achieve. Instead, we can seek a 
consensus on what is most reasonable to believe, which in turn can be the stand in for our 
truth-talk. If science admits that it is not in the business of making truth statements, but in 
making statements that are most reasonable to believe because it cannot make truth 
statements as such, then philosophy should be unable to do anything but the same. The 
only way in which philosophy would be able to claim the ability to make truth statements 
is to say that it has special access to the world in a way that science does not. That 
position of privilege seems to be untenable and hubristic.
Quine's Web of Belief
In his essay The Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine directly attacks the positivist 
understanding of empiricism, which holds that there are two types of statements: analytic 
and synthetic. Analytic statements are those statements that are true based solely upon the 
definition of the terms. For example, the statement “All bachelors are unmarried men” is  
considered to be an analytic statement for the positivists. This is because the term 
'bachelor' and the term 'unmarried men' are synonymous. All other statements are 
considered to be synthetic statements.  This offers a different, more approachable sense of 
the a priori. Instead of being merely a statement true external to experience, the positivist 
approach claims that “the truth of sentences claimed to be known independent of 
experience was reducible to matters of language” (Orenstein 871). Quine rejects this 
notion of synonymity as a means to argue for a priori truths.  Instead, he offers a holistic 
view of meaning. While his essay is intended to address problems in philosophy of 
language, we can extrapolate his ideas to encompass philosophy in general. If meaning is 
found only in relation to an entire web of belief that can be disrupted by changes, and 
everything is in principle revisable, then it seems difficult to retain the view of 
philosophy as a discipline that is attempting to get the world right. If the truth of 
statements is not able to be verified in a correspondence view, then we are left with an 
inter-subjective view of knowledge. He continued this holism in Pursuit of Truth, where 
he also attacked the distinction between syntax and semantics.
Much like the inability for us to separate the objective and subjective (which is 
the anti-realist position), Quine pointed out that it seems impossible to separate syntax 
from semantics. This is because all statements are statements about things, they have 
content. To remove content, semantics, is to remove the statement's ability to mean 
anything. To have a purely syntactical language would be to have a language void of 
meaning, and since the purpose of language is to convey meaning, this would be, to the 
pragmatist, useless to pursue.
Rorty's End-game
Richard Rorty, in his work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature explicitly attacks 
the previous two hundred or so years of focus on epistemology as a legitimate field of 
inquiry. Following Quine's lead, he attached himself to an inter-subjective view of 
knowledge such that the field of philosophy of mind required little attention. Rorty argues 
in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature that the pursuit of the mind from Plato through 
contemporary philosophers has been misguided. This is mistake was made because of a 
desire to explain how we know what we know, and thus forced us in modern times to find 
a solid picture of the mind as an object of philosophical inquiry. This is not to say that 
neuroscience does not offer us a picture of how the brain works. Rorty attempts to sever 
mind-talk from brain-talk. The mind, according to Rorty, is not a metaphysical entity. If  
philosophy of mind is jettisoned as metaphysical talk (and thus useless to the pragmatist), 
then epistemology follows. This is because epistemology as a field of inquiry is based 
upon our questions about the mind. The question “how do we know what we know” 
makes little sense if we discard the idea of a mind. The modern philosopher is left with 
little to nothing to talk about, and thus philosophy may be considered dead. This claim is 
radical and not without complications. That said, it is the end result of at least three 
centuries of American pragmatic thought, both academically rigorous as well as informal. 
Rorty is a child of the American thought process.
The Character of American Thought Generally Conceived
At this point it seems necessary to reiterate my goal. In order to show that 
America is exceptional in its thinkers, we must take a step back from the formal aspects 
of American thought and view it as a body of work. Not including informal works is to 
ignore voices that can lend to a more rich understanding of the difference between 
American thought and previous Western thought. One of the most immediately striking 
qualities of American thought is that it has a tendency, perhaps even a desire, to blur lines 
that were formerly thought to be strict. Mind/body, analytic/synthetic, syntax/semantics, 
these are all divisions that the American philosopher questions. James began to question 
the mind/body problem, considering it to be fruitless. Both Dewey and Rorty continued 
in this tradition, with Rorty adding the lessons of Quine's skepticism about the 
analytic/synthetic and syntax/semantics distinction. The skeptical character of these 
philosophers is what is marked in the history of American philosophy.
Now that we have a clear understanding of the trajectory of American 
philosophical thought, we may be able to speak to the culture underlying that thought. 
While some of the authors that will be mentioned in the section below are not 
philosophers in the academic sense, it seems rather restrictive to exclude them from 
discussion. If we restrict our understanding of the history of American philosophy to only 
those that published and taught in a formal academic setting, we are doing ourselves an 
injustice. The field of philosophy has been historically self-conscious of its own place in 
academia. The question of its usefulness has haunted the field since science has come to 
explain a number of things thought previously to be solely able to be explained 
philosophically. Therefore, philosophers have been reluctant to include works that have 
been shelved in literature as worthy of being inspected for philosophical merit. That 
reluctance, I argue, is merely an act of self-preservation. To include non-rigorous, perhaps 
even literary works in the discussion is to violate the distinction between philosopher and 
the rest of the society in which he writes, thus threatening the field as a discipline and the 
philosopher as a separate type of intellectual. We should not exclude works that 
illuminate a subject just because they lack the rigor of Carnap or the obscurantism of 
Heidegger. To do so would be to purposely exclude other voices that could add to the 
overall discussion of the history we are attempting to trace.
I shall begin by discussing Alexis de Tocqueville's observations of the philosophy 
of the American people. I shall then illuminate Thomas Jefferson's pragmatism. Lastly, I 
will address 20th and 21st century American figures including Oliver Wendell Holmes and 
Barack Obama as possible candidates for pragmatic judicial and political correlates 
respectively. In this tracing of the pragmatic character of American thought, we should 
keep an eye to the future. It is possible that the pragmatic exceptionalism is under threat,  
both from a strengthening of ideologies, but also from unfettered, democratic view of the 
truth.
A Frenchman's Observation
In 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville set out on a journey to observe the American penal 
system. What he found, however, had little to do with prisons and much more to do with 
the character of the American people. In his definitive tome on his experiences in 
America, Democracy In America, Tocqueville pinpointed what he felt was the 
“Philosophic Method of the Americans” (403). He claims that the Americans do not care 
much for European philosophy, and have no school of their own. They do have a method, 
however, which can be characterized by taking “tradition only as information, and current 
facts only as a useful study for doing otherwise and better; to seek the reason for things 
by themselves and in themselves alone, to strive for a result without letting themselves be 
chained to the means, and to see through the form to the foundation” (403).
This singular statement about the Americans is striking considering the 
rationalist/empiricist divide going on in Europe at the time. If Tocqueville was correct,  
then the Americans did not have a school of philosophical thought, but merely a method; 
they used tradition only as a starting point, and facts only as tools to participate further in 
the world. This is, without a doubt, the same sentiment that William James offered in 
What Pragmatism Means nearly eighty years later. Tocqueville continues by claiming 
that the Americans use what he calls “the precepts of Descartes,” but he is not referring to 
his rationalism, he is referring to his employment of methodological skepticism (403). 
This entire way of thinking is a direct result of democracy, not just as a political system, 
but as a social engine, according to the author. American democracy (socially and 
politically) rejected the notion of the aristocracy, the idea of institutionalized class, and 
thus allowed for a group of people who would not have been heard in France or Great 
Britain to be heard in America. Without formal classes, the American people were able to 
see possibility in their lives, and thus developed a skeptical attitude about problems. “So, 
therefore, as I studied American society, more and more I saw in equality of conditions 
the generative fact from which each particular fact seemed to issue, and I found it before 
me constantly as a central point at which all my observations came to an end” (3).
Tocqueville continues by claiming that the Americans “easily conclude that 
everything in the world is explicable and that nothing exceeds the bound of intelligence,” 
which is a direct tenet of contemporary pragmatists like Rorty (404). He is describing the 
recognition that there is sentiment in the American people that is rooted in skepticism,  
that is not hindered by talk about the relation between the world and the human being. By 
claiming that the American people feel as though everything can be explained, that is not  
to say that they feel as Peirce did, that there was a convergence of ideas that would 
eventually explain everything. The feeling is more that there is nothing beyond the grasp 
of the human intellect, nothing that we cannot be skeptical about.
In this short chapter, Alexis de Tocqueville arrives at the salient point that 
democracy itself generates this method of thought. Pragmatism appears to be not just an 
American phenomenon, but a democratic one. The American style of democratic society 
spawned this philosophical method.
Jefferson's Separation of Church and State
One of the main points of pragmatism (particularly for people like Dewey and 
Rorty) is that there needs to be a clear separation between the private and the public, and 
that the public must take priority. This separation and elevation of the public over the 
private is necessary for the conversation to continue. Democracy in America is based 
upon an understanding that politics and society are the same thing. We are as equal in our 
politics as in our society, thus, the public has to take priority. If the private, the individual,  
took precedent over the public, over society, then the cooperative spirit of pragmatism 
would be lost to selfishness and staunch individualism. In An Act For Establishing  
Religious Freedom, presented to the assembly of Virginia in 1786, Thomas Jefferson 
explained this need, and went further by placing religion in the same private sphere as 
other ways of thinking. “Our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, 
more than our opinions in physics or geometry” (247). He goes on to say that there 
should be no religious test to determine if a person is fit for public office. This is useful, 
he says, not only for the freedom of the individual, but also of the church, for if a 
particular church is favored by a government, it “destroys all religious liberty” by mixing 
the state and church in a way that distorts both spheres' characters (248). By keeping a 
separation of church and state, both the government and the church are protected from 
each other's influences. The state prevents becoming a theocracy and the church prevents 
becoming an socially controlling arm of the government.
While this bit of legislation appears to be a trifle now, it is a major break from the 
ways of the Europeans at the time. Jefferson appears to be concerned with two distinct 
issues here. First, he appears to believe that by keeping church and state separate, 
individual liberty will be retained. Secondly, the state is allowed to function free of 
religious constraint. These two ideas place religion on the same level as other schools of 
thought that we typically think of as having claims to truth, thus reducing religion to the 
level of the secular. These two concerns are pragmatic considerations for his project: 
America.
Pragmatism in Action
In order to show that pragmatism is not just a philosophical method, or that it is 
more than merely some strange amalgamation of practices that a Frenchman observed, I 
shall proceed to give two examples of pragmatic figures in American history. 
The first, Oliver Wendell Holmes, sat on the Supreme Court for the first three 
decades of the 20th century. During his time on the bench he wrote thousands of opinions 
and in those revealed his pragmatic view of jurisprudence. Holmes viewed the study of 
the law as a practice in prediction about how a judge will rule. In The Path of The Law, 
he writes “the object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of 
the public for through the instrumentality of the courts” (145). He argues in this essay 
that theory cannot be the guide to the method he is speaking of. “Theory is apt to get the 
cart before the horse, and to consider the right or the duty as something existing apart 
from and independent of the consequences” (146). Here Holmes is deflating theory into 
practice, viewing the law pragmatically, not as something different from human behavior, 
and thus finds that the legal duty is merely what sort of action one should take to be in the 
court's favor. This is thoroughly pragmatic, as it shows that supposedly solid institutions 
such as the law are as revisable as any other institution. Instead of claiming that the law 
works a certain way because it begins with theory and ends in practice, Holmes claims 
that it should all be practice.
The second example from American history that I shall explore is Barack Obama. 
The current president of the United States, although now embroiled in the thick of 
running a country, wrote extensively on his rejection of ideology and firmly-held beliefs 
when it came to decision making. In his work The Audacity of Hope, Obama pinpoints 
the American pragmatic sentiment.
It is not simply that a gap exists between our professed ideals as a nation 
and the reality we witness every day. In one form or another, that gap has 
existed since America's birth. Wars have been fought, laws passed, 
systems reformed, unions organized, and protests staged to bring promise 
and practice into closer alignment. (22)
Obama continues by claiming that democracy, and its subsequent pluralism, allow us to 
view truth in a different way, as values that some hold and others do not. That way, the 
conversation can continue so long as the private remains subservient to the public; this is 
the same point that Dewey and Rorty both emphasized in the social and political worlds, 
but it can also be reflected in the pragmatic philosophical world as well. By bringing the 
idea of practice to the forefront, we can see how that would change epistemological and 
metaphysical questions. If we were concerned with the end result, the practice, of a 
problem, then we would disregard talk that has no practical result. In other words, if we 
are pragmatic in our attitude about philosophy in the same way as we are pragmatic in 
our attitude about the social and political, then we would find that the bulk of 
philosophical problems would disappear. There would be no need to question the 
difference between mind and body, or the analytic and the synthetic, if we would seek the 
practical results of viewing the problem from one way or another. Instead of focusing on 
the problem, we could focus on the effects of taking one particular stance or another, and 
in most situations we would find that either stance yields the same practical result.
Realism Contra Pragmatism
The realist/anti-realist debate can be traced back at least to the beginnings of 
empiricism. Empiricism claims that all knowledge is a product of experience, and thus 
without observation,  we cannot know anything. This is in direct opposition to the 
rationalist stance that  knowledge is derived from reason alone. I believe it is fair to say 
that the empiricists won that debate, but in winning they produced a new set of questions, 
foremost of which is whether or not objects and events exist independently from our 
perception of them. George Berkley's idealism was a logical result of empirical thinking. 
In his essay Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, he claimed that all 
things that exist are ideas, and thus can only be known to exist through perception. The 
crux of his argument is the famous line “esse est pricipi,” (to be is to be perceived). In 
order to exist, things must be perceived (because everything is an idea), but since we as 
individuals cannot perceive everything all the time, then either things pop in and out of 
existence depending upon whether or not we are perceiving them, or there is another 
entity that perceives everything all the time. That last landing point obviously pushes to 
an argument for God. That notion is bizarre and radical, and is rather unsatisfying to the 
modern skeptic.
In more contemporary times we have a debate about the same issues that Berkeley 
struggled with most notably, do objects exist independent of our observation, and if so, 
how can we know that they exist? Two schools of thought have sprung up surrounding 
this issue. On one side, there are the epistemological realists, and on the other, there are a 
few varieties of anti-realists (including pragmatists).
Epistemological realism is the school of thought that says that the object of any 
thought exists independently of the mind. In other words, objects exist whether or not 
observation occurs. For instance, it does not matter whether or not you observe an object 
via sensory perception. The must object exist in order for you to possibly have that 
sensory perception (bracketing hallucinations or other neuropsychological phenomena). 
As a simple example, consider the following. We have a fairly complete understanding of 
the way in which the human eye works. Light either reflects off of or is emitted from an 
object and ends up entering the eye. The epistemological realist would claim that the 
object that either emitted the light or reflected it must exist in order for that perception  
(via light stimulus) to occur. That seems reasonable to believe. The realist may take one 
step further and claim that objects exist before we perceive them. While that may be the 
case, it is not necessarily so. If the realist is an empiricist then he must admit that the only 
way in which we have knowledge about anything is because of perception, thus there is 
no way to know, prior to our perception of an object, that that object exists.
Epistemological realism leads to a correspondence theory of truth, for if what we 
know about the world exists independently of our minds, then what is in our minds are 
representations of the real world external to it. A process of correspondence must then 
occur. The process begins with the existence of object x, then the observation of object x, 
a representation of that observation is then impressed, implanted, or otherwise retained in 
the observer's mind, and finally the representation is matched up to the object. The closer 
the match, the more true the observation. Thus, the issue lies with verifying the truth 
claim of a statement. Not only must we be justified in believing that a statement is true,  
we must also find some way of verifying it independently of our justification for 
believing it to be true. This seems impossible to do for all objects of thought if we can 
only know about those object via perception. In other words, empiricism requires us to 
question our ability to match any statement up to the world in such as way as to verify the 
truth of the statement.
In regards to my thesis, it is important to remember that we must reject 
epistemology as a legitimate field of inquiry in order to be able to experiment and thus 
find new ways to describe the world. Instead of matching statements up with observations 
as the epistemological realist claims that we must do, we can see which statements 
perform better in real world results. I have shown above via the description of Quine's 
work that correspondence theories of truth are difficult if not impossible to defend in the 
face of the malleability of truth claims. At this point I offer one idea to consider: if we 
were less interested in chasing truth values about observations and were more interested 
in using the labels of true and false to describe what worked in an overall system, then 
perhaps we have more fruitful, more practical conversations.
In response, the realist would reply that if pragmatism's attitude toward 
epistemology was successful, then all of our statements would be rendered meaningless. 
If we have no means by which to match up our descriptions to the outside world, then we 
are forever doomed to what is in our own minds with no access to the real world external 
to our minds. The pragmatist would then reply in two ways. First, our rejection of 
epistemology does not render statements meaningless, but it does make them revisable. In 
arguing that all statements are meaningless if not matched up to the real world is to 
assume the conclusion that we must have that matching up for meaning to exist. The 
pragmatic notion of truth forces meaning to be made via intersubjective agreement and 
not by some matching up with the outside world. Secondly, the pragmatist would be 
joyous that the realist would realize that there is no way for any observer or collection of 
observers to make that leap outside of experience, and match their thoughts up with the 
real world. This is the difficulty of the traditional epistemological model (justified true 
belief). It is impossible due to our limited station in the universe as human beings to not 
only justify a statement, but then verify its truth value. That process of verification is 
merely more justification. It is never anything more than justification. There does not 
seem to be a means of creating a clear delineation between justification and 
determination of the truth value of any statement, and thus, philosophy (as well as 
science) is a not a seeking of truth, but an attempt to show what is most reasonable to 
believe.
Lastly, the epistemological realist would respond that the pragmatist has 
developed some sort of solipsistic view of the universe, that objects do not exist until they 
are observed (and that only continued observation would preserve their existence). This is 
a straw man, one that is repeatedly lobbed at the pragmatist. Despite what some quantum 
physicists say, the real issue here is the separation between ontology and epistemology. 
The question of how we know what we know is entirely different from the question of 
what we know to exist. Until something is observed (or its effects observed in the case of 
subatomic particles and the like), there is no way for us to know that it exists. This is 
firmly empirical. Pragmatism is essentially an extension of empiricism, one that does not 
lose sight of the fact that all we know about the world we know via experience (with the 
addition of inter-subjective agreement about those experiences.).
In summary, the realist is stuck chasing truth values, trying to impossibly match 
up their impressions of observations with objects in the real world. Meanwhile, 
pragmatists are busy experimenting, attempting to solve real world problems, and going 
with what is agreed upon at the time. In essence, the pragmatist's approach to 
epistemology reflects the character of American exceptionalism described above: being 
skeptical of truths lead to the ability to change things. The realists are stuck in the same 
mode of thinking as the religious, while the pragmatists are changing with a changing 
world. Instead of seeking a solid confirmation of belief, (like the religious do) the realists 
should admit that that pursuit is actually a pursuit of more justification of their claim and 
that verification of the truth of the statement in the way they desire is impossible.
A Postmodern Response
The second counter to my claim that America is exceptional because of its method 
of thinking is a postmodern critique, specifically a Lyotardian one. Jean-François 
Lyotard, in his work The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge gives us a 
rejection of the meta-narrative3. If we can no longer rely on any sort of realism to guide 
us to the truth of matters, of the correct history, then how do we legitimize our claims?
I define postmodern as incredulity toward meta-
narratives...To the obsolescence of the meta-narrative 
apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the 
crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university 
institution which in the past relied on it. The narrative 
function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great 
dangers, its great voyages, its great goal. It is being 
dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements--
narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and 
so on...Where, after the meta-narratives, can legitimacy 
reside?
In this description of the state of contemporary philosophy, we can see the 
postmodernist chief complaint about any truth claim: there seems to be no way to rank 
one set of descriptions (narratives) above another. If meta-narratives are useless to 
determining the legitimacy of truth claims, then where can we go from there? There 
seems to be little to any postmodern answer to this question. If postmodernism were 
correct (and there is no way to legitimize that claim given the postmodern's inability to 
rank one narrative above another) then all narratives would have just as much bearing on 
reality as any other. This is a significant problem for anyone interested in creating real 
3 . A meta-narrative can be described as an idea that explains a broad range of knowledge.
world results.
One could argue that postmodernism and pragmatism are similar in attitude 
towards truth, but there is one major difference. The pragmatic response to the eschewing 
of meta-narratives as a form of legitimization of truth claims is to accept inter-subjective 
agreement as the basis for knowledge. If we consider what we tend to agree upon as the 
truth, then while that truth is subject to change, it is also the only way for us to make out 
in the world. Postmodernism and pragmatism both agree that epistemological realism is 
an untenable stance, yet postmodernism is unwilling to go the extra step and assign rank 
to inter-subjectivity the way that pragmatism does. If pragmatism were to merely throw 
up its hands the way that postmodernism appears to, then it would be giving up on the 
experimental nature of its proposal. The pragmatist is interested in action, in results, and 
that requires an acceptance of the malleability of truth claims, and running with tentative  
claims until they yield results. The question becomes which results are desirable, and the 
only way to answer that question is to witness the results and the social attitudes towards 
those results.
Therefore, when we apply the pragmatist's counter of the postmodernist's critique 
to the thesis of this essay, we can safely find comfort in the inter-subjective agreement of 
many great American thinkers. American thought is pragmatic at its core because that 
description seems to work better, yields more results, than any other description.
Politics and Pragmatism
The inter-subjective nature of pragmatism also has political ramifications, 
especially in regards to American politics. America is exceptional in its political structure  
as much as in its method of thought. One the indicators of such exceptionalism is a clash 
throughout American history between the individual and society. From the rugged 
cowboy to the Wobbly organizer, the character of America has been that of a tension 
between what is best for the individual and what is best for society. Pragmatism is 
essentially democratic because it depends upon inter-subjective agreement to settle 
disputes. If what is true is what a group of individuals agrees upon as true, then society 
holds primacy over any one individual.
This socialistic sentiment disgusts the American individualist, the political 
character that I will refer to as the libertarian. Libertarianism is a school of political  
philosophy that desires the most freedom for the individual and the least government 
involvement. Before we inspect how libertarianism and pragmatism clash, we must 
understand one thing about American political discussions: government is a product of 
society. Unlike the Western European regimes that the founders of the United States 
viewed as oppressive, the structure of the American governments (local, state, and 
federal) are democratic, and thus they are created and regulated by society. There is no 
institutionalized aristocracy, and therefore the people truly drive society, and as a result,  
the government. The individual has a tense relationship with this arrangement. If the 
public takes primacy and society makes up government, then the individual (if viewed 
through a certain political lens) is constantly at odds with the government4.
4. This tension will be discussed further in the section below.
Pragmatism is on board with the democratic sentiment, for if knowledge is what 
we agree upon, then the resultant body of knowledge is created democratically. We need 
each other to aid in defining the terms of our world. Libertarianism rejects this notion of a 
democratic agreement on truth, for if truth depends upon what a society agrees upon then 
the individual needs society to function on a very basic level.
Pragmatism Under Threat: The Rise of Ideology
In the following section of this essay I shall describe what I believe to be one of 
the most pressing issue of our time in America: a rise in ideology in our conversations 
that restrict real solutions from being found and implemented. The pragmatic historical  
tradition described above is an indicator of American exceptionalism, but that does not 
mean that the tradition will continue without effort. We exist in an interesting and vital  
point of history, one in which the American people must make fundamental choices about 
lifestyle, economics, politics, and a host of other issues. In order to do so and be 
democratic and wise in our decisions, we must have a civil conversation that is 
characterized by a willingness to experiment and compromise. In other words, we must 
be pragmatic.
It is a very unfortunate case that the sort of conversational tone I describe above is 
far from reality. It appears that what we have instead is a constant screaming match 
between at least two parties, and their intentions appear to be to win the argument instead 
of solving the problem. I shall outline below what I see as major turning points in the past 
half century that has led to this point, and what I feel must be done to ensure that America 
retains its exceptional edge by retaining its pragmatic character, for while the history of 
American thought is characterized by a pragmatic attitude, that does not mean that that  
attitude will persist on its own. We could very easily slip into a dark age of ideologically 
driven decision making that will reduce our competitive edge in the world and destroy 
our ability to effectively communicate on a global level.
Despite the rigorous discussion in academic circles surrounding what makes the 
United States different than other countries, the battle for the American mind is being 
fought almost completely outside of that arena. In fact, while actors within institutions of 
higher learning want to argue that they are above the fray, they have been firmly planted 
in the middle of the multiple ideological arguments that are eroding the pragmatic 
character of America. I shall use a timeline of the past fifty years or so to show that 
ideology has risen to new heights, which makes tempered, continuous discussion with an 
emphasis on results very difficult to hold.
My timeline begins in the 1960s. This decade can be characterized by a rise of a 
new liberalism, one interested in cultural diversity, as well as political and economic 
equality. As a direct counter to this rise of the left, a small group of influential people 
argued that this general movement went against the principles of liberty because of the 
expansion of government needed to do so. On one side of the spectrum we have 
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., an idealist of the highest order, and on the other, we 
have Milton Friedman, a strong proponent of libertarianism5. While the former influenced 
5. This is not to say that Friedman was against King and the civil rights movement. He was very much 
at least two generations of liberals, the latter gave a voice to the rise of the new right. By 
the time that Lyndon B. Johnson declared a war on poverty in 1964, the country was 
already in the grips of an ideological struggle that continues to this day.
What is interesting to note about the 1960s ideological debate is that it was 
framed in terms of liberty and justice, creating a sort of dual vocabulary depending upon 
the point of view adopted. For instance, King considered justice to be a social good that 
demands attention by all of society, placing liberty of individuals lower than social 
justice. In his letter to a group of clergymen written in a jail cell in Birmingham Alabama,  
he writes, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an 
inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny” (14). Here we see 
that King gives all of society the task of ensuring justice for everyone within our society. 
He also points out that there is no way to extract the individual from the society, and thus 
every action we make is at some point or another socialistic. This is in contrast to 
Friedman's vision of liberty. “Freedom is a rare and delicate plant. Our minds tell us, and 
history confirms, that the great threat to freedom is the concentration of power” (2). What 
Friedman describes here is a split between the individual, society, and government. 
Liberty is the ability to do what one pleases with as little government and social 
interference as possible. Since the main tenet of America's political philosophy is that the 
government is made of people working for the people despite class or social status, 
government and society are essential the same thing, which makes this power struggle 
interested in expanding minorities liberty, but he blamed a large government for creating the inequality 
problem in the first place. See Chapter VII Capitalism and Discrimination in Capitalism and Freedom.
between the individual and society dubious.
With the split between the libertarian and the progressives like King, we had the 
seeds for the largest, and longest running argument of in post civil war American history: 
is government the solution to the problem, or the creator of it? This problem was raised 
and decided upon in one of the most famous quips by any American president.
In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our 
problem; government is the problem. From time to time we've 
been tempted to believe that society has become too complex to 
be managed by self-rule, that government by an elite group is 
superior to government for, by, and of the people. Well, if no one 
among us is capable of governing himself, then who among us has 
the capacity to govern someone else? (Woodger and Burg 356)
By the time Ronald Reagan had informally declared war on the same government 
he was charged with running, the ideological split over the need for and power of 
government had deepened. With the suspect economic policies of the 1970s and the 
collective five years of recessions during that decade and the 1980s, there was enough 
fuel to add to the anti-government fire. In 1994, the most blatant description of the new 
right's ideology was formalized in the Contract with America, which outlined a need for a 
smaller congress and called for limitations on federal regulations and entitlements. This  
was concurrent with the Democrat William J. Clinton's first term as president. The 
Contract was partly responsible for Congress being controlled by Republicans and the 
standoffs between the executive and legislative branches that ensued, including the 
government shutdowns of 1995 and 1996.
The contested election of George W. Bush added more to the divisiveness of the 
political and social environment. This was followed rather quickly by the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001. For a brief period ideology seemed to have been put aside in 
favor of unity, but that sentiment quickly eroded. The left was concerned about the 
reaction that the Bush administration had demonstrated and the right was concerned with 
defending America from its detractors. 
The next decade seemed to be marked by divisive politics and a rise in ideological 
journalism. It may be too early to tell what the first decade of the 21st century means in its 
historical context, but one of the largest themes is the insistence by ideologues that their 
vision for America is the best. What is lost in this fray are solutions to serious problems 
we are facing as a nation. If we are interested more in fixing the compass of the nation to 
a certain predetermined ideological goal than to experiment and entertain new ideas that  
come from practice, then we will have lost the pragmatic tradition. This appears to be 
happening. From a poor economy to climate change, there seems to be little room for the 
pragmatic voice that wants to experiment, to try new things, and not decide beforehand 
how the country should be. The pragmatic mindset that Tocqueville described so vividly 
has been all but corrupted by the vitriol of ideologies. If this is truly the case, if the 
pragmatic character of America is waning, then its exceptionalism is waning with it.
Is American Pragmatism creating its own Enemy?
The possibility of pragmatism birthing its own enemy is startling, but real. While 
pragmatic intersubjective agreement denies the type of ideologically driven politics  
described above, it also lacks a safeguard from becoming a din of voices that could drive 
the conversation to undesirable results. In other words, the pragmatic sentiment that 
makes American exceptional could be under threat by the misguided agreement of the 
majority. We have moved from an age of information to an age of individual content 
creation and broadcast. We all have voices and we now have the means to have a global 
audience. With that expansion of voices comes the ability for a majority to rise out of that 
mass and claim truth. 
That claim may be undesirable for any number of reasons. For example, the 
theory of evolution is disputed in America, despite a near consensus in the scientific 
community and a large body of evidence to support it. If all it takes for something to be 
true is to have a large enough inter-subjective agreement about a subject, then we would 
have a situation in which the theory of evolution would not be true for society, but true 
for the scientific community. This is unacceptable.
Richard Rorty, in his essay Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility, and  
Romance explains William James' sentiment on truth.
The view that there is no source of obligation save the 
claims of individual sentient beings entails that we have no 
responsibility to anything other than such beings...So talk 
about our responsibility to Truth or Reason, must be 
replaced by talk about our responsibility to our fellow 
human beings (148).
This puts the obligation of our talk of truth in a human oriented, utilitarian sort of way. 
Instead of attempting to satisfy some sort of objective condition for truth, we should be 
thinking of truth in terms of what helps our fellow person. With that in mind, we can find 
a guidepost for tempering tyrannical majority truth claims: we are all involved in a 
project of which the goal is to allow as much freedom as possible for others so that they 
can be a part of the project. Claims that evolution is not true despite massive amounts of 
scientific evidence are usually backed up by religious claims, which are for Rorty (and 
James) private justifications for a public project. Science is public in the sense that it  
admits its revisability, religion is should be kept private because it requires beliefs in 
eternal truths that stifle conversation.
Here we see that while the majority can be abusive and can misguide the 
conversation, if we are to keep a strict division between private and public projects such 
that the conversation is allowed to continue without fear of roadblocks (like claims to 
eternal, unchanging claims to truth). Our obligation is not to satisfy some strict principle 
of verification for truth claims, but is to determine what is most reasonable to believe.
Conclusion
In this essay I have attempted to show that throughout American history there has 
been a common thread to the American character. From its founding fathers to its 
professional philosophers, pragmatism has been dominant in America's personality. This 
is a direct result of the sort of social democracy that is unique to the United States. The 
conditions that were created by the removal of  institutionalized classes. This removal led 
to a skepticism about supposedly solid ideas, which in turn led to experimentation and a 
pragmatic approach to philosophy, politics, and society. The American rejection of 
traditional epistemology is a large part of this exceptionalism. The public sphere is 
dominant over the conversation, and yet Americans still retain a healthy, protected private 
sphere. This is America's legacy, its anti-philosophical offering to the intellectual 
conversation of the history of the world.
The pragmatic tradition does not mean, either logically or historically, that it will  
continue. This tradition is threatened by two sides. The United States is faced with a 
troubling rise in divisiveness spurred by ideologies that do nothing to further 
conversations. They all but stop those conversations from happening. It is also threatened 
by a mixing of the public and the private in the overall conversation in a way that allows 
for the majority to restrict the conversation without regard for the minority. Perhaps we 
would be well advised to remember John Dewey's spirit of political and social 
experimentation, to cast aside what Richard Rorty calls conversation stoppers, and 
attempt to keep this exceptional machine running. Otherwise, we may indeed find 
ourselves behind the rest of the world in nearly every aspect while we are busy arguing 
over whose ideas are the true ones before we see their effects. 
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